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PROTECTING LOCAL AUTHORITY IN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS AND CHALLENGING INTRASTATE
PREEMPTION
Emily S. P. Baxter?
ABSTRACT
In recent years, state legislatures have increasingly passed laws that prohibit or 
preempt local action on a variety of issues, including fracking, LGBTQIA
nondiscrimination, and workplace protections, among others. Often, these 
preemption laws are a direct response to action at the local level. States pass 
preemption laws either directly before or directly after a locality passes an 
ordinance on the same subject. Scholars have seen these preemptive moves as the 
outcome of the urban disadvantage in state and national government due to 
partisan gerrymandering.
Preemption may be a feature of our governing system, but it has also become a 
problematic political tool state legislatures use to block the will of local 
governments. This Note discusses the role of cities and localities within the 
American republican system and proposes new ways to address preemption based 
on a commitment to local governing autonomy, also known as home rule. State 
constitutions and the guidelines courts use to interpret state constitutions offer an 
opportunity to improve and secure the relationship between state and local 
governments. The first Part of this Note addresses theories of local power, the 
second Part surveys a broad range of sources and examples to understand the 
scope of state preemption of local action, and the third Part critiques proposals to 
address preemption while offering new ideas to further that effort focused on 
amending state constitutions. Finally, the Appendix contains an original 
qualitative analysis of states’ constitutional home rule provisions and statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
For supporters of worker-protective workplace policies, such as 
paid sick days or a higher minimum wage, 2014 and 2015 were 
game-changing years. An unprecedented number of cities passed 
paid sick leave ordinances and minimum wage increases.1 There 
was a feeling that, while there might be legislative inertia at the 
federal or state level, cities could act and prove that these work-
place protections were effective, feasible, and forward-thinking. 
But, as low-level economic policy researchers in Washington, D.C., 
my fellow think-tank denizens and I were quickly alerted to anoth-
er growing pattern: state legislators were introducing preemptive 
1. See, e.g., Paid Sick Time Legislative Successes, A BETTER BALANCE,
https://www.abetterbalance.org/resources/paid-sick-time-laws/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019); 
14 Cities & States Approved $15 Minimum Wage in 2015, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.nelp.org/news-releases/14-cities-states-approved-15-minimum-
wage-in-2015/.
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bills to block these local actions as soon as they were passed or, 
sometimes, days before city councils voted. We saw the pattern re-
peating in other areas, such as environmental ordinances, particu-
larly local hydraulic fracturing (fracking) bans, and LGBTQIA anti-
discrimination actions—most famously with North Carolina’s 
“bathroom bill.”2 Working with my counterpart on the LGBT poli-
cy team, we learned that these preemptive moves were more than 
just political power grabs. They also raised fundamental questions 
about the functioning of American democracy at the state and lo-
cal level. They challenged typical assumptions about the structure 
of our government and its aspiration to balance power. We were 
out of our depth.
Since then, some of the nation’s foremost scholars on local law 
have taken on the effort to untangle the meaning, legal ramifica-
tions, and possible avenues for addressing state preemption of lo-
cal action. A dominant view is that such preemptive action is the 
result of a systematic urban disadvantage in representation at the 
state and national level, leading to legislatures that are skewed to-
ward the preferences of non-urban constituents and legislators that 
may disagree with the actions of local governments.3 Accepting this 
foundation, this Note seeks to broaden the universe of solutions 
that may recalibrate intrastate preemption so that it is a more de-
liberate feature of state and local governance, rather than merely a 
political opportunity. Given the difficulties of legal challenges to 
intrastate preemption discussed in Part II.C, this Note focuses on 
state constitutional and judicial reforms.
Part I of this Note explains the role that cities and localities play 
in the American governing structure. It discusses differing theories 
about the extent of local power and introduces preemption as a 
feature of our system of representative democracy. Part II looks 
more closely at the current problem: a recent wave of preemptive 
state legislation in response to local action. Part III furthers efforts 
to address the rise of state preemption by focusing on possible 
amendments to state constitutional constructions of home rule. It 
analyzes current proposals and then offers new changes to state 
constitutions and judicial procedures. Finally, the Appendix pro-
vides a qualitative assessment and comparison of states’ home rule 
provisions.
2. See, e.g., Amber Phillips, The Tumultuous History of North Carolina’s Bathroom Bill, 
which is on Its Way to Repeal, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/19/the-tumultuous-recent-history-of-north-carolinas-bathroom-
bill-which-could-be-repealed/?utm_term=.7310a08339da.
3. See discussion infra note 37. 
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I. LOCAL AUTONOMY AND ITS CHALLENGES
Within the structure of American government, localities are 
seen both as creatures of the state4 and as independent governing 
entities.5 There are benefits and disadvantages to each outlook. 
State legislatures may have more expertise to analyze issues and 
implement laws that affect a whole state.6 At the same time, locali-
ties are often made of discrete populations with specific governing 
needs. They may be able to “try out” new policies that would be dif-
ficult to enact statewide.7 Despite—or because of—cities’ growing 
economic and cultural power, discussed below,8 states have increas-
ingly passed laws that specifically preempt local action on a broad 
range of issues.9 In some instances, states passed preemption laws 
just after or just before a particular city passes an ordinance, sug-
gesting reactionary state action.10 Part I situates this phenomenon 
within the context of general principles about the role of local po-
litical subdivisions in the constellation of American government 
and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of preemption.
A. Cities in the American System
Since the late nineteenth century, the baseline theory of the role 
of cities in the American governing structure has been that cities 
are creatures of the state.11 The United States Constitution does 
not mention local governments,12 and conceptions of American 
federalism tend to focus on the relationship between the “dual 
sovereignties” of the federal government and state government.13
Following this line of thinking, states permitted localities to create 
local governments in order to implement state goals and duties in 
places that, at one time, were isolated from other metropolitan ar-
4. Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional 
Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 372 n.7 (2008) (referencing 
Judge John Dillon’s “Dillon’s Rule”); see, e.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
5. See discussion infra note 18 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. Id.
8. This Note does not focus on the difference between city or urban governance and 
other forms of local government, such as in rural areas or suburbs.
9. Nicole DuPuis et al., City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A State-by-State Analysis 2018 
Update, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES 3 (2018), http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-
03/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf.
10. Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1165–66 
(2018). 
11. Parlow, supra note 4, at 372.
12. Id.
13. Rick Su, Intrastate Federalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 191, 211 (2016).
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eas or from the state legislature.14 Until the late nineteenth centu-
ry, local governments tended to operate under Dillon’s Rule, a 
common-law principle that allowed cities and localities to take ac-
tion only where the state had given them a specific grant of pow-
er.15
Unlike Dillon’s Rule, “home rule” is the term used to describe 
local governments’ ability to make policy and govern of their own 
accord.16 The movement for home rule began in 1875 with a con-
stitutional amendment in Missouri,17 but its origins are often at-
tributed to Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas Cooley.18 In 
14. Parlow, supra note 4, at 372.
15. Id. at 372 n.7, 383.
16. Richard Briffault et al., The Troubling Turn in State Preemption: The Assault on Progres-
sive Cities and How Cities Can Respond, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. AND POL’Y 2-3 (2017) (citing 
Paul A. Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1124 (2007)), 
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ACS_Issue_Brief_-
_Preemption_0.pdf.
17. Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban Disadvantage 
Through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1065 (2017). Under the 1875 constitu-
tion, “large cities” could adopt their own charters. MO. CONST. ART. IX § 16 (1875), 
http://www.archive.org/stream/cu31924030493419/cu31924030493419_djvu.txt. The law 
required that the local charters align with the state constitution and laws, and specially high-
lighted that the state legislature retained power over St. Louis, even if it had its own charter. 
As one early commentator complained: “[h]ome rule in Missouri was unfortunately born 
with serious congenital defects. . . . Taken at face value, this language would appear to indi-
cate that what the state gave with one hand it took away with the other.” Henry J. Schmandt, 
Municipal Home Rule in Missouri, 1953 WASH. U. L. Q. 385, 387 (1953), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3603&context=law_lawrevie
w.
18. Justice Thomas Cooley expressed his ideas about local power in his opinion for the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s 1871 case, People ex rel. Leroy v. Hurlbut:
The doctrine that within any general grant of legislative power by the constitution 
there can be found authority thus to take from the people the management of 
their local concerns, and the choice, directly or indirectly, of their local officers, if 
practically asserted, would be somewhat startling to our people, and would be 
likely to lead hereafter to a more careful scrutiny of the charters of government 
framed by them, lest sometime, by an inadvertent use of words, they might be 
found to have conferred upon some agency of their own, the legal authority to 
take away their liberties altogether. . . . We have taken great pains to surround the 
life, liberty, and property of the individual with guaranties, but we have not, as a
general thing, guarded local government with similar protections. We must as-
sume either an intention that the legislative control should be constant and abso-
lute, or, on the other hand, that there are certain fundamental principles in our 
general framework of government, which are within the contemplation of the 
people when they agree upon the written charter, subject to which the delega-
tions of authority to the several departments of government have been made. 
That this last is the case, appears to me too plain for serious controversy. 
People ex rel. Leroy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 97–98 (Mich. 1871). According to Judge David 
Barron, Cooley’s outlook was partially a product of the constitutional interpretation of Coo-
ley’s era: “This organic approach to constitutionalism was typical of his time. . . . As a result, 
Cooley’s defense of local governmental independence, although formally based in state law 
norms, was rooted in a larger constitutional vision that he believed to be capable of general-
ization.” David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 487, 511–12 (1999).
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the intervening century, most states have adopted a form of home
rule authority for localities.19 Some states have “legislative home 
rule,” where local governments are granted broad authority to leg-
islate on any subject “unless defined”—that is, prohibited—by the 
state legislature.20 This type of home rule gives localities considera-
ble freedom to pass laws.21 Other states operate under a narrower 
“imperio” home rule regime, where state legislatures grant localities 
specific spheres of power, such as zoning or municipal develop-
ment.22 Neither legislative nor imperio home rule provides particu-
larly strong protections from preemptive action by state legisla-
tures, although many states’ home rule structure includes some 
constitutional or legislative limits on the state legislature’s power, 
as well.23 By Professor Davidson’s count, thirty-seven state constitu-
tions require state legislation to be general, rather than of “local 
concern.”24 As such, states are often prohibited from passing laws 
specifically targeting a particular locality or a particular local ac-
tion.25 At least fifteen states limit—via state constitution or state su-
preme court interpretation of the state constitution—the ability of 
the state legislature to “override certain local enactments.”26
Given the potential for states to limit local action even where 
home rule exists, a number of academics argue that home rule is 
more nominal than substantive. By this view, home rule is not “an 
identifiable sphere of local autonomy.”27 Instead, it is a “constella-
tion of grants and limitations that ‘powerfully influence[] the ways 
in which cities and suburbs act.’”28 Professor Stahl argues that 
home rule did not transform cities and suburbs into autonomous 
actors precisely because the “dividing line between local and state 
19. Diller, supra note 17, at 1065.
20. Nestor Davidson, STATE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOCAL 
PREEMPTION LEGISLATION, LEGAL EFFORT TO ADDRESS PREEMPTION (LEAP) PROJECT (March 
2017), https://www.abetterbalance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/State-Substantive-
and-Procedural-Restraints.pdf.
21. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1193.
22. Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1271, 1275–77 (2009). See also Richard Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 2 n.2 (describ-
ing the historical evolution of the types of home rule); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 
I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13–17 (1990). 
23. See infra Part III.A. 
24. Davidson, supra note 20 (“Roughly 37 states constitutions provide that legislation 
must be general, as opposed to ‘special’ or ‘local.’ Although the jurisprudence is varied, it is 
perhaps not too much of an oversimplification to say that a statute that relates to persons or 
things as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things 
of a class is a special law. Similarly, a local law is a kind of special law, where the subject of 
the law is a specific locality or group of localities singled out from the class of all localities.”
(citation removed))
25. Id.
26. Diller, supra note 17, at 1065.
27. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1193.
28. Id.
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affairs is extremely amorphous.”29 As definitions or political moti-
vations change, states have passed laws and courts have interpreted 
them, as well as the meaning of “local concern,” in ways that are 
often deferential to state control.30 Moreover, different states have 
different judicial tests for determining what is or is not a state con-
cern. Given persuasive arguments on both sides, Stahl notes that 
courts are hesitant to sacrifice “statewide uniformity” and “com-
promise states’ police powers.”31
When courts do take a stance on local versus statewide concern, 
decisions often fall along a public-sphere versus private-sphere di-
vide: Courts tend to relegate local power to the realm of “home 
and family” or “associational” concerns rather than “regulation of 
the market.”32 Issues such as education, housing, or land use are 
often found to be local concerns, while regulation of “commercial 
and other market actors,” including issues involving worker and 
workplace protections or environmental regulations affecting 
businesses, are held to require statewide uniformity.33 This may 
suggest an anti-urban bias in courts’ and legislatures’ view of home 
rule.34
B. The Contested Role of Cities and Localities
The proper allocation of city and local power is a more contro-
versial debate today than it has been in decades. Many large cities 
wield social, economic, and political power far greater than the 
Founders may have imagined.35 Disputes and disagreements arise 
for a number of reasons, including the fact, as Professor Schragger 
argues, that city boundaries are based on an “identifiable constitu-
ency,” whereas state boundaries are more arbitrary and based on 
history and geography.36 Cities may be in a better position to make 
29. Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
133, 171 (2017).
30. See infra notes 119–23, 144–45 and accompanying text. 
31. Stahl, supra note 29, at 171.
32. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1194–95. 
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1193–95. Professor Schragger explains that local grants of power are “more 
readily enjoyed by suburban jurisdictions and easily effaced when locals seek to regulate 
powerful commercial and financial actors.” This idea grows out of Barron’s argument that 
zoning and land use issues invoking home rule often come from “suburban power” trying to 
“protect property values.” Id. at 1193–94. 
35. See Parlow, supra note 4, at 372–73.
36. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1185.
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effective policy because their constituents are more likely to be 
bound by shared experiences, concerns, and needs.37
There are competing perceptions of the advantages and disad-
vantages of local governance: On one hand, the ability of econom-
ically and politically powerful localities to experiment with and im-
plement tailored policies can be seen as an important opportunity 
to improve Americans’ lives. Cities can serve as “laboratories of in-
novation,” and strong local power allows local governments to ad-
dress concerns that might differ from other parts of their state.38
Local governments can be more responsive to constituents because 
both the governments and constituencies are smaller (that is, 
made of fewer people); members of communities may have more 
access to their elected officials and greater opportunity to be civi-
cally involved.39 Policy innovations that may not be feasible or polit-
ically possible at the federal or state level may find a home at the 
local level. For example, since 2013, twenty-eight cities have passed 
ordinances ensuring that workers have access to paid sick days,40
while a federal paid sick days bill has been reintroduced and ne-
glected in Congress seven times since 2004.41 Paid sick days ordi-
nances are often proposed by the political left, and the success of 
local-level legislation highlights the fact that city sovereignty has 
inescapable political and ideological components.42 Cities or urban 
areas are increasingly liberal, or at least more likely to vote for the 
Democratic Party, while rural and non-urban areas are more likely 
to vote for the Republican Party.43 In other words, intrastate 
preemption laws are, in part, an outgrowth of differences in ideol-
ogy and policy priorities between localities and states.
37. This Note does not focus on the difference between city or urban governance and 
other forms of local government, such as in rural areas or suburbs. In the last two years, 
there have been multiple articles discussing the “urban disadvantage” within state legisla-
tures. Bringing together federalism and politics, these articles argue that more liberal con-
stituents in cities can create large margins for candidates on the left. State legislatures with 
many rural districts tend to elect more legislators on the right, however, and rural repre-
sentatives can outnumber their counterparts from cities even though they represent fewer 
people. In other words, rural areas often have an outsized sway in state legislatures. This is 
true at the national level as well. This phenomenon is important context for explaining the 
success of preemptive state-level moves, as well as the political and ideological differences 
between state and local actors. See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1—The Urban 
Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287 (2016); Diller, supra note 17.
38. Parlow, supra note 4, at 375.
39. Id. at 374. 
40. The National Partnership for Women and Families, CURRENT PAID SICK DAYS LAWS
(2017), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-family/psd/current-
paid-sick-days-laws.pdf.
41. Healthy Families Act, H.R. 4575, 108th Cong. (2004), https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/108/hr4575.
42. See supra discussion in notes 34 and 37.
43. See Stahl, supra note 29, at 136.
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On the other hand, there is concern that an influx of local regu-
lation will create an untenable patchwork of laws within states.44
From this view, for example, different minimum-wage require-
ments in different cities might inhibit intrastate business invest-
ment because a business would be unable to keep track of what it 
must pay its workers in each city or municipality. The argument 
follows that there are certain issues that require uniformity across a 
state.45
Although an advocacy perspective as opposed to an academic 
one, the American City Community Exchange (ACCE) takes the 
stance that the Constitution’s vision of federalism purposefully in-
cludes only state and federal divisions. ACCE is an offshoot of the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which is devoted 
to engaging “local elected officials and leaders from business and 
industry for the advancement of limited government and free 
market principles.”46 By this logic, local government is only meant 
to be an administrative extension of the state.47 Further, one pro-
ponent of preemption argues that state-level opposition to local 
ordinances is consistent with conservative ideology in that it is re-
sistance to big government via “nanny-statist municipal bureau-
crats.”48
Preemption is an integral piece of American governance, yet 
Professor Briffault labels the current situation of explicit, state leg-
islative preemption as “new preemption.”49 “Old preemption” was 
“a judicial determination” about whether local law contradicted 
preexisting state law50: “Classic preemption analysis harmonized 
the efforts of different levels of government in areas in which both 
enjoy regulatory authority and determined the degree to which 
state policies might coexist with local additions or variations.”51 In 
recent years, localities and cities have taken more direct policy ac-
44. Patrick Gleason, 2017 Looks to Be a Big Year for States Beating Back Local Tyranny,
FORBES.COM (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickgleason/2016/12/06/
2017-looks-to-be-a-big-year-for-states-beating-back-local-tryanny/#20c505d13ee0 (“It makes it 
more difficult and costly to do business and work in a state when there is a patchwork of lo-
cal laws and regulations for companies and workers to navigate. This is why it is a good for 
employers and employees alike for states to preempt things like local minimum wage hikes 
and occupational licensing requirements.”).
45. See, e.g., Stahl, supra note 29, at 171; Gleason, supra note 44. 
46. American City County Exchange (ACCE), “About ACCE,” http://www.acce.us/
about/.
47. Jon D. Russell & Aaron Bostrom, FEDERALISM, DILLON RULE AND HOME RULE,
AMERICAN CITY COUNTY EXCHANGE 3 (2016), https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/
2016/01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf.
48. Gleason, supra note 44.
49. Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997–98 
(2018).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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tions, and these ordinances have increasingly been met with reac-
tionary preemption laws at the state level. In other words, where 
cities pass laws that do not expressly conflict with state or federal 
law, states legislatures have passed laws targeted at specific cities, 
where permitted, or specific policy issues that bar the local action.52
Due to state supremacy, the state-level laws preempt the local laws.53
Today, scholars are striving to articulate a new theory of local 
control that addresses the political underpinnings of the wave of 
state preemption legislation. If leveraging preemption as a political 
tool is undesirable, understanding why doing so does not “seem 
right” still requires a theory of local power. In early 2018, Professor 
Richard Briffault expressed reticence about efforts to imbue theo-
ries of local control with “a political valence” where there should 
not necessarily be one.54 This concern is essential: If efforts to dis-
rupt the current pattern of intrastate preemption become—or at 
least, are perceived as—left-leaning cities’ attempts to wrest more 
power from conservative state legislatures and vice versa, a shift in 
state-level or local-level partisan politics may disrupt the whole or-
der.55 In other words, a sound theory of local authority that pro-
tects local actors from state-level preemption should be just as ap-
plicable and appealing regardless of which political party or ideo-
ideological group is in control.
Preemption is a part of our constitutional structure, and scholars 
acknowledge that, on certain issues, equally persuasive arguments 
can be made in favor of local control and state control.56 The criti-
cal question is, when do preemption laws go too far? This Note 
posits that if intrastate preemption is a thinly-veiled tool to thwart 
opposing political interests or appease political stakeholders, then 
it is not serving its purpose as a systemic mechanism of governance. 
The rest of this Note operates from the starting point that local 
control is worth protecting regardless of political or ideological 
motivation. The current wave of preemption laws may be politically 
opportunistic and undertheorized, but preemption laws are not an 
illegitimate use of a structural feature of our democratic system. 
52. See Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy 
Innovation, 47 J. FEDERALISM 403, 405–07 (2017).
53. Richard Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 9–10. 
54. Briffault, supra note 49, at 2026. (“So are the concerns raised by the new preemp-
tion really about local autonomy, or is local autonomy only a means to the end of advancing 
preempted policies? If, as Kenneth Stahl argues, ‘it is unlikely that voters and legislators will 
see the question of local power as anything but a partisan issue,’ should these issues—of 
firearms, workplace equity, discrimination, immigration law enforcement, or public 
health—be argued solely on substantive policy lines rather than as also involving local au-
tonomy? Certainly there is no necessary connection between local autonomy and progres-
sive values.”).
55. Id. at 2027. 
56. Stahl, supra note 29, at 171.
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This Note proposes solutions, through state constitutions and judi-
cial interpretations, that may provide local government with more 
opportunities to challenge and check preemptive action by state 
legislatures.57
II. THE STATUS OF PREEMPTION IN STATE AND LOCAL LAW
A. State-Level Preemption Laws Across the Country
Part I addressed the broad background of state-level preemption 
of local ordinances. Part II investigates specific illustrative exam-
ples of preemption, as well as the recent increase in preemptive 
legislation. Preemptive actions from state legislatures are not an 
explicit political movement, but they are undergirded by the calcu-
lated actions of political strategists.58 In many cases, it is difficult to 
see this increase in state preemption as anything other than a reac-
tion to increased governing action at the local level, especially on 
highly political, controversial issues.59
57. See, e.g., id. at 174 (“When courts proceed on the assumption that Madisonian de-
mocracy is still operative, despite increasing evidence that society is composed of competing 
groups, it leads precisely to the political crisis point we have now reached, in which a domi-
nant group uses the structure of democratic institutions to preserve its dominance.”).
58. See discussion of ALEC and ACCE, infra Part II.B. 
59. Sometimes, the reaction happens at both the state and local level: Following the 
2016 presidential election and the introduction of the “Stop Dangerous Sanctuary Cities 
Act” in Congress in 2017, for example, at least four cities declared themselves sanctuary cit-
ies and thirty-seven cities recommitted to their sanctuary city status, for a total of around 330 
sanctuary cities. Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52, at 414. In turn, since 2015, the number of 
state legislatures considering legislation to preempt local sanctuary city actions has increased 
over time, with at least eight states considering bills in 2015, an additional eighteen states 
considering bills in 2016, and 29 states considering bills in 2017. The state bills had mixed 
success. Id. at 415.
Professors Briffault, Davidson, Diller, Johnson, and Schragger detail another high-
profile example that shows the reactionary aspect of state preemption laws. Since 2015, Ar-
kansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee have enacted preemptive legislation to prevent local
authorities from creating LGBTQIA antidiscrimination ordinances that were more protec-
tive than state laws. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 6. These preemption laws followed ef-
forts in cities to enact greater protections for LGBTQIA people. Id. North Carolina’s “bath-
room bill” may be the most well-known of these preemption laws. In February 2016, 
Charlotte, North Carolina, passed an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in public ac-
commodations based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The ordinance also permit-
ted transgender people to use the bathroom that aligned with their gender identity. Id. at 7; 
DuPuis, supra note 9, at 11. In response, in March 2016, the North Carolina legislature 
passed a law that prohibited local antidiscrimination ordinances related to public accom-
modations and employment. Further, the law provided that bathrooms must be designated 
for use by people based on their biological sex, and the definition of “biological sex” includ-
ed the gender assigned at birth. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 7; Camila Domonoske and 
James Doubek, North Carolina Repeals Portions Of Controversial ‘Bathroom Bill,’ NPR (Mar. 30, 
2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/30/522009335/north-carolina-
lawmakers-governor-announce-compromise-to-repeal-bathroom-bill; Camila Domonoske, AP 
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Preemptive action at the state level touches a vast array of sub-
stantive issues, including fracking, employment issues, antidiscrim-
ination laws to protect LGBTQIA people, zoning, the use of pesti-
cides, public and charter school policy, affordable housing re-
requirements, plastic bag use, and the provision of public internet, 
among others.60 The National League of Cities produced an exten-
sive report documenting and quantifying state legislation, although 
the report does not show when the preemption laws were actually 
passed. However, the National League of Cities’ numbers still show 
the extent of preemption legislation as of early 2018 on a wide va-
riety of issues:
? Twenty-eight states had laws that preempted local ac-
tion relating to the minimum wage. In certain states, 
such as Colorado and New Hampshire, these were 
longstanding state regimes.61 However, North Caroli-
na, Ohio, and Alabama implemented their laws in 
2016.62
? Twenty-three had laws that preempted local action re-
garding paid family and medical leave.63
? Forty-one states preempted local action on “transpor-
tation network companies,” such as Uber and Lyft.64
? Twenty preempted local governments’ ability to estab-
lish municipal broadband.65
? Forty-two states placed some sort of limitation on local 
government’s ability to regulate taxing and spending.66
These limitations appear to be older and more estab-
lished, as many were first introduced in the 1970s.67
? Forty-three states prevented local governments from 
passing firearm or ammunition safety ordinances that 
are more stringent than state laws.68
The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) has analyzed the timing of 
some preemption laws, focusing on laws preempting wage and la-
Calculates North Carolina’s ‘Bathroom Bill’ Will Cost More Than $3.7 Billion, NPR (Mar. 27, 
2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/27/521676772/ap-calculates-
north-carolinas-bathroom-bill-will-cost-more-than-3-7-billion.
60. See generally Richard Schragger, LEGAL EFFORT TO ADDRESS PREEMPTION (LEAP)
PROJECT, STATE PREEMPTION OF LOCAL LAWS: PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE AREAS
(2017), https://www.abetterbalance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/State-Preemption-
of-Local-Laws.pdf.
61. DuPuis, supra note 9, at 6. 
62. Id.
63. Id. at 8. 
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 17. 
66. Id. at 20. 
67. Id.
68. Id. at 23 (citing the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence).
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bor ordinances at the local level. EPI found that of the twenty-five 
states that have preempted local minimum wage ordinances, ap-
proximately half have done so since 2013.69 Of the twenty states 
that preempt paid leave laws, only one preemption law was enacted 
prior to 2011.70 Of the twelve states that have passed laws preempt-
ing local governments from passing prevailing wage laws, which 
require contractors to pay workers the average wage in a locality 
when working on public construction contracts, eleven have been 
passed since 2013.71
Perhaps most remarkable is that, since 2015, nine states have 
passed laws that prevent local governments from passing ordinanc-
es to regulate the ways in which workers’ hours can be scheduled. 
EPI did not find any similar laws prior to 2015, and most of these 
laws were passed in 2016 and 2017.72 The only law recorded in 2015 
was Michigan’s “Death Star Bill,” which prohibits a variety of local 
regulation relating to labor and employment. It prohibits localities 
from raising the minimum wage, regulating paid or unpaid leave, 
and regulating employee scheduling, among other provisions.73
The Michigan bill was singular because most preemptive legislation 
is enacted piecemeal. By contrast, the Local Government Labor 
Regulatory Limitation Act, the enacted version of the Death Star 
Bill, was an effort to ensure that the state “occupied the field” or 
totally regulated any action in that area.74
These data provide an illustrative, if incomplete, picture of the 
state of preemption laws throughout the country. Understanding 
the uptick in state preemption laws is another matter, however. It is 
not entirely clear why preemption laws are on the rise, but legal 
and political theorists, as well as political advocacy organizations, 
have some opinions.
69. See Marni Von Wilpert, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, CITY GOVERNMENTS ARE 
RAISING STANDARDS FOR WORKING PEOPLE—AND STATE LEGISLATORS ARE LOWERING THEM 
BACK DOWN fig. A (2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/city-governments-are-raising-
standards-for-working-people-and-state-legislators-are-lowering-them-back-down/.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The law provides an example of “express preemption,” stating: “The legislature 
finds and declares that regulation of the employment relationship between a nonpublic 
employer and its employees is a matter of state concern and is outside the express or im-
plied authority of local governmental bodies to regulate, absent express delegation of that 
authority to the local governmental body.” Local Government Labor Regulatory Limitation 
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 123.1382 (LexisNexis 2017).
74. See Local Government Labor Regulatory Limitation Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 
123.1381 (LexisNexis 2017). The law’s broad-ranging and immediate effect inspired its 
nickname. See Emily Lawler, ‘Death Star’ bill protesters interrupt House committee meeting, MLIVE
(May 19, 2015), https://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/index.ssf/2015/05/death_star_
bill_protesters_int.html (“If this bill passes the voices of millions of Michigan voters will be 
silenced very suddenly. That’s why it’s a death star [referencing the Star Wars films]”). 
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B. Explaining the Rise in Intrastate Preemption
Throughout the United States, state legislatures have become 
more conservative, while cities have grown more liberal.75 Profes-
sors Diller and Stahl emphasize preemption as a byproduct of 
more liberal cities’ disadvantage within the state system. In other 
words, as conservative legislators gained power in state capitals and 
found themselves beholden to rural constituents, they passed more 
preemption laws.76 At the same time, state legislators are less con-
cerned with preemption laws causing economic harm to rural are-
as or a state overall because there are fewer economic links be-
tween cities and rural areas than there have been in the past.77 This 
outlook suggests that deregulatory ideology must carry some 
weight in state legislators’ decisions to take action in certain are-
as.78
Professor Stahl goes so far as to say that cultural differences cre-
ated by the rural/urban divide mean that the “traditional rivalry 
between urban and rural areas in American politics is now ex-
pressed vertically in the relationship between the state and its cit-
ies.”79 It is difficult, otherwise, to understand why rural voters would 
be concerned whether Detroit, for example, is able to raise its min-
imum wage or regulate how private businesses schedule their 
workers’ hours. Why should “big government” action in a city mat-
ter to those who do not live there? Preemptive action allows state 
legislatures to advance their own ideological goals and score a win 
against their political opponents, as represented by localities and 
local actions. In fact, EPI noted that while ALEC and ACCE have 
argued against a “patchwork of laws” related to local minimum 
wage increases or scheduling regulation, they have encouraged lo-
cal governments to create a different patchwork of laws by adopt-
ing “right to work” ordinances, which are traditionally conserva-
tive, anti-labor measures.80
Professor Schragger argues that efforts to preempt local regula-
tion appear to be a reaction to a perceived threat from “wayward” 
cities and an effort “driven by a combination of corporate deregu-
latory opportunism, culture-war hostility, and economic popu-
lism.”81 A concern is that state legislators may not always thought-
fully consider the potential future ramifications of their 
75. Stahl, supra note 29, at 136-37.
76. See id. at 154.
77. Id. at 146.
78. See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 10, at 1182. 
79. Stahl, supra note 29, at 144. 
80. Von Wilpert, supra note 69, at 15. 
81. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1215–16.
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preemptive moves. State legislatures’ reactionary preemption laws 
also lack a persuasive intellectual foundation. Protecting cities 
from “nanny-statist municipal bureaucrats”82 may be well and good; 
yet, by passing preemptive legislation, state legislators take on the 
role of nanny-bureaucrat themselves. Why does “deregulation” at 
the local level require regulation at the state level?
While political motivations may be a large part of the reason 
preemption has become a more common practice for state legisla-
tures, there is also evidence that conservative political organiza-
tions and lobbyists have contributed in a concerted effort to use 
preemption to advance policy goals.83 Most scholars indicate the 
importance of ALEC, in addition to industry groups.84 ALEC pro-
vides “assistance with strategic planning” and even offers free, 
online model legislation for preemptive state-level laws.85 For ex-
ample, preemption bills in both Alabama in 2016 and Arkansas in 
2017 contained language that was strikingly similar to one of 
ALEC’s model bills, “The Living Wage Mandate Preemption Act.”86
The model bill contained the following language: “private enter-
prises in this state must be allowed to function in a uniform envi-
ronment with respect to mandated wage rates.”87 In turn, the Ar-
kansas bill argued that “‘allowing localities to mandate employer-
provided benefits would create a patchwork of local regulations’ 
that would burden businesses.”88
It makes sense that industry and lobbying groups seek favorable 
legislation at the state level: “The vertical fragmentation of authori-
ty in a three-tiered political system provides for multiple bites at 
the legislative apple.”89 If the point is increased opportunity to 
82. Gleason, supra note 44.
83. Professor Riverstone-Newell catalogues the ways in which industry and lobbying 
groups have worked to influence state actors and, in some cases, “rein in” cities and “create 
a friendlier business environment for themselves.” Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52, at 405. 
She notes that at least one tobacco company urged states to pass preemption laws in the 
1980s in order to avoid local smoking restrictions. Id. Likewise, in the 1990s, the National 
Rifle Association successfully campaigned for laws that preempted local firearm regulation 
and, as mentioned above, today forty-three states have some form of preemptive law relating 
to firearms. Id.
84. Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52, at 405–06; Schragger, supra note 10, at 1170; 
Stahl, supra note 29, at 137 n.9.
Notably, Professor Stahl dismisses the work of groups such as ALEC and its progressive 
counterpart, the State Innovation Exchange, as “part of the same process of political and 
geographic polarization that has caused city and state governments to assume such diver-
gent political profiles.” Stahl, supra note 29, 137 n.9. I believe there is some room to ques-
tion whether such coordinated advocacy campaigns are part of polarization and urban/rural 
division or whether they are actually, in part, a driver of action-oriented polarization.
85. Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52, at 405. 
86. Von Wilpert, supra note 69. See also DuPuis, supra note 8, at 6. 
87. Von Wilpert, supra note 69. 
88. Id.
89. Schragger, supra note 10, at 1184.
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achieve policy goals, then there is motivation to take advantage of 
structural levers such as preemption. Other factors also matter, 
however, and the current surge in preemption legislation at the 
state level can be seen as a combination of increased political po-
larization, particularly between rural and non-rural constituencies, 
and increased local government action on certain issues.90 Regard-
less of political beliefs—whether cities are acting beyond their pur-
view or state legislators are taking advantage of the system to notch 
a political win—preemptive state action raises deep questions 
about the interplay of government at different levels. Preemption 
laws present an issue in need of reform.
C. The Difficulty of Challenges to State-Level Preemption Laws
Localities hoping to challenge new or old state-level preemption 
laws have an uphill battle. Part III focuses on reforms to state con-
stitutions and judicial interpretation because of the issues with liti-
gation challenges outlined in this sub-Part. The few exemplary fed-
eral cases often rely on equal-protection claims, which courts 
typically reject.91 Lewis v. Bentley, for example, challenged an Ala-
bama law that preempted local governments from raising the min-
imum wage.92 Alabama’s legislature passed the law shortly after 
Birmingham enacted an ordinance raising the minimum wage.93
Litigants from Birmingham argued that “by shifting decision-
making authority from a city with an African-American majority to 
a white-dominated state legislature, preemption restructured deci-
sion-making in a manner that violated equal protection.”94 The dis-
trict court rejected this argument, and dismissed the case.95 The 
court was not persuaded that preempting local action on the min-
imum wage was sufficiently related to racial discrimination, even if 
most minimum-wage earners in Birmingham were Black.96 In July 
2018, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
surprisingly reversed in part and remanded the case.97 The panel 
addressed standing issues before holding that plaintiffs had stated 
a valid equal protection claim under Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
90. See, e.g., Riverstone-Newell, supra note 52; Schragger, supra note 10; Stahl, supra
note 29.
91. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 13.
92. Lewis v. Bentley, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13565 *1 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 1, 2017).
93. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 14–15. 
94. Id.
95. Id. at 15.
96. Id. See also Lewis, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13565, at *1.
97. Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, 896 F.3d 1282, 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018).
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tan Housing Development Corporation.98 Of course, it remains to be 
seen whether, on remand, Birmingham’s equal protection claim is 
successful.
The success of state-law challenges relies on the nature of the 
preemptive law, the sort of home rule protections enshrined in a 
state constitution, and the type of challenge brought (procedural, 
dealing with general laws, etc.). Two recent successes actually high-
light the difficulty of winning preemption challenges absent en-
grained constitutional or judicial footholds. First, Coral Gables, 
Florida, successfully defeated a state statute that prohibited local 
regulation of the use of Styrofoam containers.99 This win was predi-
cated upon the nature of Florida’s Constitution, however, which 
prohibits the state legislature from passing any law targeted solely 
at Miami-Dade County, of which Coral Gables is a part.100 Second, 
in City of Cleveland v. State of Ohio, the court drew upon “long-
standing Ohio precedent” to hold that a law targeting an employ-
98. Id. at 1294 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977)). For a discussion of the ways in which the Eleventh Circuit’s application of Arlington 
Heights was surprising, see Recent Case: Equal Protection—Race Discrimination—Eleventh Circuit 
Reverses Dismissal of Discrimination Claim Relying on Historical and Statistical Evidence—Lewis v. 
Governor of Alabama, 896 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 771, 775–78 
(2018).
It is worth noting that, in Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a 
political process argument. The viability of a political process argument elsewhere is un-
clear. Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, 896 F.3d at 1297–98. See, e.g., Briffault et al., supra note 16, 
at 13–14 (discussing this process argument where there is a “bare desire” to harm a “pro-
tected group.”). Hunter v. Erickson and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 created an 
opportunity for “scrutin[y of] structural actions that place a ‘special burden’ on the ability 
of minorities to achieve their policy goals in the political process.” Id. at 14 (citing Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 
(1982)). Briffault et al. argue that the Hunter and Seattle decisions might allow members of 
protected groups to argue that the “reallocation of power from the local level to the state 
level” creates a special burden. Id. In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integra-
tion & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 
1637–38 (2014), however, the Supreme Court rejected the application of Hunter and Seattle
to a Michigan ballot initiative that prohibited race-based preferences in public university 
admissions. The Court held that Hunter and Seattle addressed actual injuries, or the serious 
risk of injury, to a protected group, while Schuette was about whether Michigan voters could 
decide if universities should continue to use a system of racial preferences. Schuette v. BAMN,
134 S. Ct. 1637–38 (“This case is not about how the debate about racial preferences should 
be resolved. It is about who may resolve it.”). The Court was divided in Schuette. It is not clear 
that a Hunter or Seattle-style argument could survive without showing that a policy was inten-
tionally discriminatory, even though the holding in Schuette did not overturn Hunter or Seat-
tle. Id. at 1637–38. The Eleventh Circuit was similarly reticent in their interpretation of 
Schuette. Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, 896 F.3d at 1298. (“Thus, while we acknowledge the 
social and economic history behind the plaintiffs’ assertion that the minimum wage is a ra-
cial issue, their claim still falls outside the Supreme Court’s limited application of the politi-
cal-process doctrine to laws explicitly addressing racial harms such as segregation and dis-
crimination in the housing market.” (citations removed)).
99. Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. The City of Coral Gables, No. 2016-018370-CA-01, 6–7 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.politico.com/states/f/?id=0000015b-f3b6-d5fd-a55b-
fffe81150001; Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 12.
100. Briffault et al., supra note 16, at 12.
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ment-related Cleveland ordinance did not meet the Ohio Constitu-
tion’s generality requirement.101 In other words, the state legisla-
ture’s law was so clearly an effort to limit or target the Cleveland 
ordinance that it could not be deemed permissibly general and 
applicable to the whole state as required by the Constitution.102
These two successes owe much to the specific quirks of the re-
spective state constitutions and case law out of which they come. 
For Coral Gables, while some states require state legislatures to pass 
laws that are “general” and affect all localities, there are fewer in-
stances of states that prohibit laws targeted at specific cities or local 
governments.103 Courts tend to find laws to be general if they can 
affect all localities in a state, even if they particularly affect one.104
For City of Cleveland, Ohio’s case law is unusual in its suspicion of 
nominally general laws. A litigation challenge to a law that specifi-
cally preempts or explicitly occupies a field, such as Michigan’s 
“Death Star” bill, would be much more difficult because Michigan 
does not have the judicial or statutory safety valves to check 
preemptive action by the state legislature.105
As such, Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association v. City of 
Pittsburgh might be a more typical example of an attempt to chal-
lenge a preemptive state law.106 In that case, the court rejected 
Pittsburgh’s argument that it was permitted to enact a paid sick 
days ordinance under its home rule charter. The court held that 
this was not the type of public health law considered by the charter 
and that the charter also prohibited Pittsburgh from placing “af-
firmative duties” upon employers.107 The dissent urged that this de-
cision read limitations into Pittsburgh’s home rule charter that did 
not exist.108 It highlighted precedent that recognized the difference 
between health and safety ordinances that affect businesses and or-
dinances that are intended to regulate businesses.109
In conclusion, preemption as a political and ideological tool 
touches many substantive issue areas and there has been an uptick 
of state legislation within the last five years that has responded di-
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See infra Appendix. 
104. Davidson, supra note 20. 
105. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
106. Pa. Rest. & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 79 C.D. 2016, 2017 Pa. Commw. 
Unpub. LEXIS 356, at *1 (2017). 
107. Id. at *5. 
108. Id. at *10–12. 
109. Id. It must be noted, however, that shortly before this Note’s publication, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that the paid sick leave law was within Pittsburgh’s home rule 
authority. Matt Miller, City can force private employers to provide paid sick leave, Pa. Supreme Court 
rules, PENNLIVE (Jul. 17, 2019), https://www.pennlive.com/news/2019/07/city-can-force-
private-employers-to-provide-paid-sick-leave-pa-supreme-court-rules.html.
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rectly to or anticipated local action. While preemption and “intra-
state federalism” are important functions of our governing system, 
local governments should have the ability to rebut state legisla-
tures’ preemptive actions. The next Part discusses the theory be-
hind trying to find a middle ground and stakes a claim for greater 
local power, while retaining preemptive ability.
III. RE-IMAGINING LOCAL POWER WITHIN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The issue-specific nature of recent state-level preemption laws 
and the downloadable, boiler-plate bills for state legislators 
demonstrate that there is an effort to use preemption as a tool to 
arrest local action driven by partisan and demographic divides. 
There is an evolving debate among scholars of local power about 
the best way to “reboot” home rule laws and principles to provide 
local governments with greater protection from preemption and 
more opportunity to challenge preemptive actions by state legisla-
tures.110 Part III examines and critiques proposals that have already 
been made and offers further solutions.
There is longstanding writing on the role judicial interpretation 
can play in reorienting home rule. Often, preemption-focused le-
gal challenges turn on whether state law explicitly or implicitly 
preempts a field of regulation such that it prohibits local action in 
that field or issue area.111 In some instances, judicial analysis also 
requires an assessment of the state legislature’s intent.112 This can 
be an opaque inquiry, and at least one scholar posits that there 
should be an “express-only” default rule in judicial determinations 
of preemption.113 In other words, local ordinances should only be 
preempted when state law expressly says they are.114 Professor Diller 
notes that this stance deprives judges of discretion and flexibility to 
handle “unforeseen circumstances.”115
110. See, e.g., Defending Local Democracy, A BETTER BALANCE,
https://www.abetterbalance.org/resources/defending-local-democracy/ (last visited Apr. 
14, 2018); The Local Solutions Support Center (LSSC), LEAP, http://leap-
preemption.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2018). These projects appear to be con-
nected.
111. See generally Diller, supra note 16.
112. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Paul Diller, Massachusetts,
URB. L. CTR., at 3–4 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1;
Paul Diller, Texas, URB. L. CTR., at 2–3 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-
of-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller, Washington, URB. L. CTR., at 4 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
113. Diller, supra note 16, at 1159.
114. Id.
115. Id. Instead, he favors a “substantial interference test” that asks courts to weigh 
whether a local ordinance “contravenes the broad purposes of state law.” Id. at 1168–70. 
Professor Diller sees this avenue of judicial interpretation as a flexible method for ensuring 
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In light of the fact that judicial challenges to intrastate preemp-
tion have been limited by restrictive interpretations of state consti-
tutions and ironclad state laws, Part III extends previous research 
and proposes state constitutional changes to better address the
problem of intrastate preemption, in addition to recommenda-
tions for judicial interpretation. Passing constitutional amend-
ments may be a tall order for states that have passed local preemp-
tion laws; yet, it is also important to consider all possible reforms as 
local actors and state legislators look to redefine the home rule 
framework in a way that presents a coherent theory of local control 
and is less vulnerable to the political motivations of state legislators 
who disagree with local actors.
A. State Constitutional Home Rule and Arguments for 
Local Immunization
Although most states provide for some sort of home rule for lo-
calities, there is considerable variety among states. Some states,
such as Alabama and Delaware, do not have constitutional home 
rule of any kind.116 Instead, state statutes provide for local grants of 
power or limited home rule, but these laws do not have the proce-
dural protections that constitutional home rule provides—that is, it 
is more difficult to change constitutions. In Alabama, for example, 
a 1975 state law grants some authority to municipal corporations.117
While the state permits local action, it also leaves the door wide 
open for state-level preemption.118
Even in states that do provide for constitutional home rule, the 
extent and expression of home rule can be constrained in certain 
ways. For example, some states limit home rule by the size of the 
city, municipality, or county. In Illinois, counties and municipali-
ties with over 25,000 people are automatically considered home 
rule units, while all other municipalities may elect to become 
protection for local policy innovation and protection from local “expropriative” or exclu-
sionary action. Id. at 1170. 
116. Paul Diller, Alabama, URB. L. CTR., at 1 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/Table of Contentscopy-of-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller, 
Delaware, URB. L. CTR., at 1 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-
materials-1.
117. See Diller, Alabama, supra note 116, at 1 (providing that local corporations can 
adopt ordinances to “provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity and 
improve the morals, order, comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality, 
and may enforce obedience to such ordinances”). 
118. See id. (“The legislature shall not have the power to authorize any municipal corpo-
ration to pass any laws inconsistent with the general laws of this state.”).
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home rule via referendum.119 Moreover, the grant of home rule 
powers can be limited to specific issue areas or expressly subject to 
the state legislature’s decision to preempt. Again, Illinois’s Consti-
tution serves as a useful demonstration: “[A] home rule unit may 
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its gov-
ernment and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to 
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and 
welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” At the same time, the 
state legislature has the option to “deny or limit” any home rule 
authority with a three-fifths vote.120 In other words, large cities and 
municipalities can do as they please, unless the state legislature says 
otherwise. Home rule that grants broad authority to local govern-
ments but also retains state preemption power is a common ap-
proach to constitutional home rule.121
There are two other approaches to constitutional home rule: 
enumerated powers and immune powers. Alaska’s constitutional 
home rule provision, for example, is cabined by a state statute that 
lists sixty-seven state laws representing areas where the state has 
denied home rule units’ authority. The listed areas focus on regu-
latory concerns (such as licensing and waste disposal), taxation, 
and election structure.122 Yet the list also includes quirkier areas of 
state-only regulation, such as public breastfeeding and unmanned 
aircraft (presumably drone) photography.123 While clear and pre-
cise, this reliance on enumerated grants and denials of power is 
cumbersome. It also relies on express preemption, which can cre-
ate other problems.124 It stands to reason that the rigidity of such 
constitutional provisions or state statutes is inelegant and difficult 
to overcome through judicial testing. Enumerating provisions 
place control in the state legislature and leave localities with little 
recourse.125
Although many states have a form of constitutional home rule, 
fifteen states provide localities with some constitutional or statutory 
119. Paul Diller, Illinois, URB. L. CTR. 1 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/
copy-of-leap-materials-1.
120. Id. (citing ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g)) (“The General Assembly by a law approved 
by the vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house may deny or limit the power 
to tax and any other power or function of a home rule unit not exercised or performed by 
the State . . . .”).
121. See infra Appendix. 
122. ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.200. See also Paul Diller, Alaska, URB. L. CTR. 2 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
123. ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.200. See also Diller, Alaska, supra note 122.
124. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
125. By contrast, Illinois might provide a more functional comparison. Illinois’ Constitu-
tion enumerates more grants and prohibitions for home rule units than other states’ consti-
tutions, but it also includes broad grants of power and instructs a liberal reading of the 
grants. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
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protection from preemption.126 This number is debatable depend-
ing on how protection or immunity is defined. Functional immuni-
ty from state interference—areas in which the state cannot act 
short of constitutional amendment—is typically limited to purely 
structural and local issues, such as compensation for local offic-
ers.127 But there are other forms of protection, as well: For exam-
ple, Colorado’s Constitution provides that the state cannot over-
ride local action on “purely local and municipal matters.”128 The 
constitution enumerates some areas that are local and municipal 
concerns, including the structure of local elections and mecha-
nisms for collecting local taxes, but does not limit home rule to 
these issue areas.129 Even with protections as robust as these, home 
rule in Colorado only applies to localities with more than 2,000 
people. Further, the judiciary has a significant role in determining 
whether an issue is of local concern, opening the door to more 
limited interpretations of “purely local and municipal matters.”130
Professor Diller sees exceptions to home rule provisions that 
permit only “general” state laws to preempt local authority as a 
form of “soft immunity.”131 Whether these requirements serve as 
real protection from preemption is debatable, as courts are often 
more inclined to find laws to be general rather than targeted.132
Moreover, constitutional requirements that a state’s legislature can 
only pass laws of “general concern” also serve as “soft immunity” 
for local government actions and provide opportunity to challenge 
laws that target specific localities or local actions.133 There is a 
counterpoint to that assessment of general laws, however. Most 
states already prohibit their legislatures from passing “special or 
local” laws.134 The problem lies in the fact that state constitutions 
do not always define “special,” and these provisions have often 
been interpreted as prohibitions against “private laws”—that is, 
laws affecting a specific corporation or person, rather than specific 
localities.135
Other states protect home rule via judicial interpretation: In 
Connecticut, the Constitution does not explicitly provide protec-
126. Diller, supra note 17, at 1067. 
127. Id.
128. Paul Diller, Colorado, URB. L. CTR. 1 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/
copy-of-leap-materials-1.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2.
131. See discussion infra at pp. 971–72, as well as Appendix for examples of local protec-
tions from state preemption.
132. Id.
133. See Diller, supra note 17, at 1050–51. 
134. Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
719, 720 (2012). 
135. Id. at 724.
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tion for home rule, but judicial interpretation has created immuni-
ty in “the organization of local government (structural) and pro-
cedures for local budgeting.”136 In California, local home rule gov-
ernments are protected from state interference as long as the issue 
addresses local concern. In 1992, the California Supreme Court 
held that Los Angeles could amend its charter to allow for public 
financing for city elections, despite the fact that a statewide propo-
sition had banned such funding.137
Professor Diller advocates for strengthening constitutional home 
rule protection as a means of arresting the current wave of 
preemption efforts and taking a step toward rebalancing urban 
disadvantage.138 In his view, broader protections might serve the 
function of halting intrastate preemption by protecting the local 
minority from the state legislative minority.139 If—as this Note ar-
gues—preemption is a function of the weakness of “intrastate fed-
eralism” or state governing structures that mirror federal-state fed-
eralism but lack formalization, explicit constitutional protections 
can embed de facto assumptions about local power.140 These re-
form ideas are presented in Part III.C.
136. Paul Diller, Connecticut, URB. L. CTR. 3 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
137. Paul Diller, California, URB. L. CTR. 3 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
138. Diller, supra note 17, at 1066–67.
139. Id. at 1050–51. 
140. Stahl, supra note 29, at 164. Stahl goes even further and argues that the current rise 
in preemption is exactly because “intrastate federalism” is not true federalism: “The root of 
the problem is that intrastate federalism is not a true federal system, in which subgroups 
have constitutionally committed power, but a unitary system in which state legislatures have 
ample room to decide how much authority to confer upon substate groups.” Id. at 171. 
Moreover, courts are reluctant to interpret greater authority for local governments because 
of a “suspicion” of “group rights” “rooted in the tradition of Madisonian liberalism that fears 
‘factions’ . . . .” Id. Professor Stahl differs from Professor Diller on an important point, how-
ever. He does not believe that more solid grants of power to local governments will solve the 
problem of preemption because they will inevitably rely on courts’ interpretation of local 
and statewide concerns. Id. at 174–175 n. 206. Instead, he argues that home rule is weak-
ened by the process failure of partisan gerrymandering and advocates for the Supreme 
Court to rule that partisan gerrymandering is judiciable in an effort to disrupt the ur-
ban/rural divide and strengthen the opportunity for local governments to act free from fear 
of a state legislature’s politically-motivated retaliation. Id. at 175–177. (His ideas come from 
an article published before the Court’s recent decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 
2484 (2019), of course.)
His argument seeks to bypass the political implications of the current preemption de-
bate: 
Because partisan gerrymandering assures rural Republican control of the 
statehouse in many places, urban Democrats can only wrest such control by relo-
cating power elsewhere, and so home rule becomes a kind of code word for parti-
san politics. To strengthen home rule, in other words, would be to empower 
Democratic cities vis-à-vis Republican legislatures; to weaken it would be to do the 
opposite. In light of the obvious political implications of home rule, it is unlikely 
that voters and legislators will see the question of local power as anything but a 
partisan issue.
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Protecting local authority through immunizing home rule from 
state interference is an efficient, yet deliberate, solution because it 
reinforces the system of norms as it functions.141 Even if local gov-
ernments are “creatures of the state,” it does not necessarily follow 
that the state would or should want to centralize all local deci-
sions.142 While it is true that the state-local relationship does not en-
tirely correlate to federal-state federalism, there is still value in the 
model of cooperative federalism. Professor Davidson makes this 
argument in terms of federal-local relationships.143 As he sees it, 
“cooperative localism” provides for local experimentation and au-
thority while balancing the power of the federal sovereign.144 The 
analogy is not a perfect fit, but the cooperation comparison is apt. 
There is value in local control either by necessity or function of the 
system. Intrastate preemption that negates the will of local gov-
ernment, then, serves as a warning that the cooperative norms are 
not enough. Constitutional home rule protections are an oppor-
tunity to codify or solidify an important set of norms without re-
quiring a total denial of the federalism-esque give-and-take be-
tween state and local power.
There is one final factor in debates of constitutional home rule 
and local protection: if local control is inherent in our system of 
governance, then protections from state preemption of local ac-
tion should not be limited by the size of the locality, city, or munic-
ipality in question. Professor Diller points out that such an inter-
pretation of local power has “always been a minority position in 
American jurisprudence.”145 He argues that local immunization 
without regard to the size of a locality would underscore rural and 
suburban communities’ advantage.146 Professor Diller’s goal is to 
remedy the urban/rural divide in state politics, with the rise in 
state preemption demonstrating an undesirable outcome of that 
divide. He is concerned about the potential externality effects of 
small local government action, but it is not entirely clear how size-
Id. at 176. This is a very compelling argument. At the same time, and at the risk of not giving 
the concerns at the heart of Federalist 10 their due, the justiciability of partisan gerryman-
dering speaks to negotiating the factions that already exist. Strengthened and protected 
home rule could correct course for the future. Protecting local power from state or local 
factions with greater grants of home rule power is not necessarily partisan or extreme. In-
stead, a more balanced and formalized structure would reorient the rules of the road. 
141. See Briffault, supra note 49, at 2021–22.
142. See discussion infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
143. Nestor Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sov-
ereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 975–76 (2007).
144. Id. at 976.
145. Diller, supra note 17, at 1090–93.
146. Id.
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specific home rule provisions affect the political balance of state 
legislatures or the distribution of seats in Congress.147
B. Addressing the Divide Between State and Local Concerns 
The problem of state and local concerns is critical in contem-
plating the form and function of a stronger constitutional home
rule framework to combat the misuse of intrastate preemption. In 
states where there is home rule of any kind, the dividing line be-
tween that which can and cannot be preempted by the state legisla-
ture often turns on whether an issue is purely local or one that re-
quires state uniformity and control.148 The state and local concern 
question is typically a judicial one, and states vary considerably in 
tests and interpretations.149 For example, in Oklahoma, courts have 
not outlined a clear test, but have determined that certain areas 
are purely local concerns, such as the procedure for local elec-
tions.150 Oregon eschews the traditional state/local divide and al-
lows state preemption of any “substantive social, economic or regu-
latory objective, unless the law is shown to be irreconcilable with 
the local community’s freedom to choose its own political form.”151
Still, this has been used to preempt considerable areas of regula-
tion.152
There is debate about how courts should interpret statewide ver-
sus local concerns. To Professor Diller, everything comes down to 
the state/local concern question because only local concerns are 
protected under a strengthened constitutional home rule frame-
work.153 In fact, he argues that requiring states to only enact gen-
147. Id. at 1089–91. Professor Diller’s primary contention about the danger of home rule 
protections unlinked to locality size is the fact that small communities may take actions that 
would have effects on other communities: “Similarly, when a rural county seeks to exempt 
itself from state gun control requirements, it allows firearms to be purchased there that can 
then be used to commit violence in other parts of the state and nation.” Id. at 1091–92. He 
also notes that these externality concerns apply to larger cities or even counties, as well. Giv-
en this, the link between size-limited local immunity and remedying the urban disadvantage 
in state politics is unclear.
148. See generally Diller, supra note 16; Briffault, supra note 49.
149. See, e.g., People v. Llewellyn, 257 N.W.2d 902 (Mich. 1977) (outlining Michigan’s
preemption test); Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992) (outlining California’s
preemption test).
150. Paul Diller, Oklahoma, URB. L. CTR., at 2 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
151. Paul Diller, Oregon, URB. L. CTR., at 2 (May 2017) (citing City of La Grande v. Public 
Employees Retirement Board, 576 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Or. 1978), aff’d on reh’g, 586 P.2d 765 
(Or. 1978)), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
152. Id. at 3. 
153. Diller, supra note 17, at 1049–50 (“At its core, constitutional home rule rests on a 
judicial defined distinction between ‘statewide’ and ‘local’ matters, with only the latter being 
immune to preemption.”).
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eral laws in areas that need state uniformity creates a backdoor to 
local immunity from preemption because a law targeted at a par-
ticular locality might be challenged as “not general.”154 The uni-
formity and generality requirements “call for a heightened level of 
judicial inquiry into whether the state’s interest in preempting the 
local government is legitimate.”155
That said, there is a small but notable distinction among states 
with “general law” requirements. Many states, such as Georgia, New 
Mexico, and Arkansas, prohibit local action from conflicting or be-
ing inconsistent with state “general law.”156 A smaller number of 
states, including Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Tennessee, require 
state laws to be “general” or “uniform,” rather than special, local, 
or targeted at one or more particular localities.157 The latter provi-
sions often have some exceptions that permit special or local laws, 
such as when voters approve of or request them.158 This may be a 
distinction without a difference, but provisions of the latter sort 
(limiting states’ ability to pass targeted or special laws) may provide 
more protection than requirements in the first category (requiring 
local governments to conform to general laws). Requiring state leg-
islatures to pass laws that affect all local governments—and possibly 
preventing them from passing targeted laws—might be interpreted 
as a more explicit signal of a state legislature’s desire to protect lo-
cal autonomy. These requirements limit the state legislature’s, ra-
ther than local governments’, ability to act and may provide local 
governments with an opportunity to challenge targeted laws. At the 
same time, in many instances, it may make sense that home rule 
provisions and statutes prohibit local governments from creating 
ordinances that conflict with existing state law. Home rule is about 
providing opportunity and protection for local action, but it in-
cludes a necessary tension of line drawing between local and state 
power.159
154. Id. at 1077 (citing City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 967–68 (Oh. 2002)).
155. Id.
156. Paul Diller, Georgia, URB. L. CTR., (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/
copy-of-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller, New Mexico, URB. L. CTR., (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller, Arkansas, URB. L.
CTR., (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1. Wisconsin 
prohibits local action that conflicts with laws that are general and uniform, that is, apply to 
all cities and relate to an issue of statewide concern. This inclines courts to find conflict, as 
facial uniformity satisfies the requirement. Paul Diller, Wisconsin, URB. L. CTR. 2 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
157. Diller, Massachusetts, supra note 112; Paul Diller, Minnesota, URB. L. CTR., (May 
2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1; Paul Diller, Tennessee, URB.
L. CTR., (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
158. See, e.g., Diller, Minnesota, supra note 157, at 3. See also Appendix infra.
159. Briffault, supra note 22, at 89–90 (“[In Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968),
the Supreme Court recognized] the ‘universal’ existence of local governments possessing 
considerable autonomy and providing an important representational function. . . . [T]he 
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While Diller leans into the state/local divide, Professor Briffault 
takes another tack. He argues that the judicial question should 
turn on whether the state is unduly impinging on the “local capaci-
ty for self-governance.” 160 By his estimation, this question elimi-
nates the need for a state/local consideration.161 This interpreta-
tion grounds the question in a locality’s ability to act, rather than a 
judicial suspicion that local action may have crossed a line: “[A] 
preemption measure should be held invalid if it interferes with the 
power to act in the first place, which is the undisputed purpose of 
home rule and which is essential to local government’s place in 
our system.”162 This analysis means that localities can bring court 
challenges against state preemption efforts to occupy an entire 
field of regulation where both local governments and the state 
have acted or where there is not defined grant of authority, such as 
Michigan’s Local Government Labor Regulatory Limitation Act.163
Moreover, he argues that this framework might also be used to 
challenge state actions that create a “regulatory vacuum” by deny-
ing local authority to act without creating any substantive state laws 
on the matter.164
Professor Briffault’s rework of the judicial test to determine state 
and local power is very persuasive. It provides an opportunity to 
move away from a state/local analysis that, as he points out, “long 
resisted, and is likely to long continue to resist, consistent, princi-
pled, neutral decision-making.”165 The fact that the test creates a 
“home rule presumption” could go far in making it easier to chal-
lenge preemptive state legislation. At the same time, this new test is 
not without limits. First, it still relies on judicial interpretation of 
vague constitutional or statutory terms. As this Note argues below, 
home rule may be a situation in which more constitutional specific-
ity is warranted. Second, the test turns entirely on “unduly imping-
ing.” Rather than relying on a single question of a state and local
divide, Professor Briffault’s test asks another singular question that 
at its base is no different: Is this the type of issue or policy that local 
normative implications are unmistakable. Avery treats counties and municipalities as political 
institutions that initiate their own actions on behalf of local citizens rather than just imple-
ment state actions locally. . . . By raising localities to the status of governments, Avery also 
raises the standing of the principle of local self-government. . . . Avery in a sense complements 
Hunter [v. City of Pittsburgh], providing doctrinal recognition of the fact that, in practice, local 
governments are agents of both the state and of local constituents, carrying out state functions locally 
and acting on behalf of local residents and local interests. These two ways of conceiving of local legal 
status are not entirely inconsistent but there is a tension between them.”) (emphasis added). 
160. Briffault, supra note 49, at 2022.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 2023. 
164. Id. at 2024.
165. Id. at 33. 
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governments should be allowed to enact without interference from 
the state?
C. Changing Both State Constitutions and Judicial Interpretation
Professor Briffault and Professor Diller both offer intriguing 
proposals to remedy the issue of state preemption of local action. 
Still, neither solution is entirely satisfying, perhaps due to the fact 
that both of their recommendations are aimed at remedying the 
democratic dysfunction exemplified by the rural/urban divide. 
This Note offers reforms that build upon both Diller and 
Briffault’s proposals but have a different focus. The goal of the re-
forms proposed below is to strengthen the role of local govern-
ments and create opportunities for localities to challenge state leg-
islatures’ preemption laws. These reforms should be both 
substantive and institutional. In other words, the substance of state 
constitutions should include greater protections for local authority 
and more clear paths to challenge state-level preemption. At the 
same time, a substantive move also requires institutional actors to 
consider who should decide if preemption is appropriate and how 
these decisions should be made. These reforms do not seek to 
eliminate the ability of states to preempt local authority or to cor-
don localities into their own untouchable spheres of sovereignty. 
The current wave of preemption legislation skews to one side of 
the political spectrum (the right preempting local action on the 
left), but it also uncovers an opportunity to make the state-local re-
lationship function better. The goal is to make sure that our gov-
erning structure represents underlying intuitions and norms about 
self-representation, power balancing, and policy innovation, and 
does not only present an opportunity to take advantage of the 
structure for political gain.
This Part proposes three ways to achieve this goal by: 1) codify-
ing a presumption of inherent local authority in state constitutions; 
2) providing strong and explicit state constitutional protections for 
local actions in the face of preemption; and 3) creating more 
checks, both in state constitutions and judicial interpretation, to 
enable local governments to challenge state preemption.
First, an institutional recommendation: It is worthwhile to 
ground the idea that local governments have inherent authority in 
both judicial interpretation and state constitutions. Courts should 
implement Briffault’s presumption of home rule in their interpre-
tations.166 If the goal is fighting “new preemption,”167 as opposed to 
166. See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text. 
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remapping the rural/urban divide, a thumb on the scale for local 
decisionmakers simply iterates a presumption (local governments 
have inherent powers) that already exists.
One way to achieve this goal would be to give interpretative 
weight to statements of legislative intent in constitutional home
rule provisions and to create new provisions where they do not ex-
ist. Some states have these provisions, and a few even speak to un-
derlying assumptions about local authority. For example, Massa-
chusetts’s Constitution provides that the purpose of its home rule 
provisions is to “reaffirm the customary and traditional liberties of 
the people with respect to the conduct of their local govern-
ment.”168 A Kentucky statute is more focused: “The powers herein 
granted are based upon a legislative finding that the urban crisis 
cannot be solved by actions of the General Assembly alone, and 
that the most effective agency for the solution of these problems is 
the government of a city of the first class.”169 New York’s Constitu-
tion states, “Effective local self-government and intergovernmental 
cooperation are purposes of the people of the state.”170 In addition 
to these legislative statements, at least nineteen states provide in 
their home rule laws that powers granted to localities should be 
liberally construed in localities’ favor, and at least six states provide 
that enumeration or description of local powers should not be in-
terpreted as limiting local powers.171 In some cases, these state pro-
visions were meant to make it clear that the state was abrogating 
Dillon’s Rule in favor of home rule.172 These provisions might not 
be enough to sway a judicial interpreter on their own, but they may 
serve as an indication and codification of a state government’s be-
lief in local authority and intention to protect it.173
167. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
168. MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 1.
169. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83.410 (4).
170. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
171. See Appendix. For example, New York’s Constitution has both a liberal construction 
provision and a statement of intent: 
It is not the intention of the legislature hereby to abolish or curtail any rights, 
privileges, powers or jurisdiction heretofore conferred upon or delegated to any 
local government or to any board, body or officer thereof, unless a contrary inten-
tion is clearly manifest from the express provisions of this chapter or by necessary 
intendment therefrom, or to restrict the powers of the legislature to pass laws 
regulating matters other than the property, affairs or government of local gov-
ernments as distinguished from matters relating to their property, affairs or gov-
ernment. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE § 50-51.
172. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. IV, §7, ¶ 11. See also Paul Diller, New Jersey, URB. L. CTR., at 
2 (May 2017), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
173. In a singular example, West Virginia’s state court’s refusal to recognize home rule 
and use of Dillon’s Rule principles triggered the creation of a Home Rule Pilot Project, 
which permits certain cities to pass ordinances that conflict with state law, with oversight 
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Finally, a presumption of local authority also means that home 
rule should not or need not be limited by the size of a city, munic-
ipality, or locality. If local authority is good for local governments, 
it should be available to them all. This does not negate the fact that 
increased local authority might not make sense or be desirable for 
every town or village in the United States. The current home rule 
systems in states show that many eligible localities choose to not 
become formal home rule entities.174 Rather, a home rule pre-
sumption adjusts the starting point for determinations of local 
power.
Second, a substantive recommendation: State constitutions 
should provide some grant of explicit protections to local home 
rule entities. While express immunity limited to certain issue areas 
might be too formally rigid, there is value in explicitly protecting 
areas of local action, particularly if that protection is undergirded 
by a Briffault-esque recognition that state legislatures should not 
interfere in areas where local governments have previously acted.175
Currently, states vary considerably in the extent to which local 
authority is immune from state preemption or intervention, from 
explicit spheres of total local control to easily circumvented prohi-
bitions of targeted laws.176 Areas of total local control are often lim-
ited to hyper-local issues, such as the compensation of local officers 
or the structure of the local government. For example, in Ohio, 
the “power of self-government,” or the power to address issues re-
lated “solely to the government and administration of the internal 
affairs of the municipality,” appears to be immune from state 
preemption.177 Oklahoma’s statute also firmly prevents preemption 
by providing that local ordinance “prevails over state law on mat-
ters relating to purely municipal concerns.”178 There are two cave-
ats to Oklahoma’s clear and explicit protection, however: First, be-
cause the provision is statutory, it is more easily changed than a 
state constitution. Second, “purely municipal concerns” is vague 
from a state “Home Rule Board.” Paul Diller, West Virginia, URB. L. CTR., at 3 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
174. For example, in Tennessee, only 2 of 95 counties and 14 of 348 cities have adopted 
home rule charters. For cities, this may be because of strong limitations to home rule pow-
ers. For counties, state statute provides non-home rule counties with some of the powers of a 
home rule charter. Paul Diller, Tennessee, supra note 157, at 2–3 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
175. See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
176. See Appendix. 
177. Paul Diller, Ohio, URB. L. CTR. 3 (May 2017) (citing Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. 
Co., 880 N.E.2d 906, 914 (Ohio 2008)), https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-
materials-1.
178. OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 1-102.
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and has given Oklahoma courts the opportunity to limit an already 
limited grant.179
To address intrastate preemption and provide protections with 
some teeth, it might be necessary for states to give courts clearer 
instructions. For example, Maine has an unusual statutory provi-
sion that provides the focus for determining if a local law can be 
preempted: “Standard of preemption. The Legislature shall not be 
held to have implicitly denied any power granted to municipalities 
under this section unless the municipal ordinance in question 
would frustrate the purpose of any state law.”180
Finally, constitutional protections for local action may not need 
to be ironclad to be effective against preemption. Instead, it might 
be better to ensure that there are safety-valve exceptions to local 
protections. For example, some states have exemptions to their 
general law requirements that often require the request or approv-
al of the localities affected by a special law.181 These laws permit lo-
cal involvement or require local approval in a way that would be 
useful in the preemption context, where the issue is centered on 
the conflicting wills of local governments/residents and state legis-
lators.
More importantly, state constitutions should provide protections 
for local action that do not live or die by judicial line-drawing be-
tween state and local concerns. Current state constitutions tend to 
rely on enumeration, whether intricately specific or broad catego-
ries of “local issues.”182 Instead, state constitutions’ home rule pro-
visions could also ensure protections for local action through 
preemption prohibitions on state legislatures. For example, a state 
constitution could provide that the legislature shall not preempt or 
prohibit local authority without a legitimate state interest. A legit-
imate state interest would then be defined as local government ac-
tion that contradicts existing state law, local action that threatens 
an aspect of state functioning, local action where the state was pre-
paring to pass laws in a particular field, or some other constitu-
tional or practical concern. This sort of protection departs from 
Briffault’s proposal by placing the onus on the state, rather than 
the locality, to defend its actions. Requiring an explanation of state 
interest also addresses the concern that states create a policy vacu-
um where they preempt a field of regulation from local action but 
decline to take state action.183
179. See Diller, Oklahoma, supra note 150, at 2–3.
180. ME. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 3001(3).
181. See Appendix. 
182. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.200 with ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
183. See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
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Requiring the state to give a firm and specific reason for 
preempting local action either in statute or in response to a legal 
challenge places less emphasis on the vague line between state 
concerns and local concerns. The question would become: Is the 
state’s interest important enough or legitimate enough? This 
might trade one set of judicial considerations for another, but ex-
amining the state’s interest gets closer to the heart of current 
preemption issues. It addresses the legislature’s intent by asking 
whether it sought to prevent consequences that matter to the state 
as a whole or whether the state only intended to prevent certain 
local actions for political reasons. New York courts make a similar 
inquiry when the state enacts a special or targeted law that is pur-
portedly based on a statewide concern. Such laws must “bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the legitimate, accompanying substantial 
State concern.”184
Third, a recommendation that is both substantive and institu-
tional: There should, simply, be more built-in checks to state 
preemption. State constitutions should have explicit general law 
requirements. These requirements, or additional statutory provi-
sions, might grant local governments standing to challenge nomi-
nally general laws. While there is room to debate how specific a 
state constitution should be in defining a cause of action for locali-
ties, local governments should have an enshrined opportunity to 
challenge preemption laws. These challenges could follow two dif-
ferent paths, depending on the issue: First, a locality might chal-
lenge the generality of a law as pretext. In other words, a law’s 
nominal application to an entire state could in actuality have been
intended to undercut a particular city’s ordinance. Ohio courts 
consider similar issues in determining whether a preemptive state 
law is general. One part of Ohio’s test includes: “A statute must . . .
set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than pur-
port only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corpora-
tion to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations . . . .”185
In addition, localities should be able to challenge preemptive 
state legislative action that creates a policy vacuum. If a law that af-
fects an entire state creates an unknown frontier where local gov-
ernments cannot act, and state governments choose not to, then it 
should be possible to question why the issue requires generality 
and uniformity across the state. While Briffault’s interference anal-
184. City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n, 676 N.E.2d 847, 851 (N.Y. 
1996)). See also Paul Diller, New York, URB. L. CTR. 4 (May 2017), 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
185. Diller, Ohio, supra note 177, at 3 (citing Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 968 (Ohio 
2002)).
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ysis idea asks similar questions,186 greater clarity in a constitutional 
text combined with an opportunity to challenge nominally general 
laws creates more flexibility to focus on facts and legislative intent, 
rather than a judicial determination of the line between a balance 
of power and undue interference.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether it is merely a byproduct of the urban dis-
advantage in the American political system, targeted and vindictive 
state preemption of local ordinances is a problem worth address-
ing. Intrastate preemption represents more than a mere battle of 
political wills. Additionally, the problem lies in a state’s ability to 
use an open-ended and undefined feature of our governing struc-
ture in an unintended way. Understanding the proper place for 
state preemption and local home rule requires a greater depth of 
thought and attention to consequence than current preemptive ef-
forts tend to express. It may be that we will one day accept politi-
cally-motivated state preemption of local laws as a proper expres-
sion of the state-local relationship. However, in the absence of 
good reasoning for why this should be the case, this Note posits 
that the opposite is true: There is value and merit in local action 
and autonomy. By reassessing our understanding of and commit-
ment to home rule, it is clear that state constitutions may be better 
used to protect the goals of local governance. Likewise, refined ju-
dicial inquiries can delve deeper into the motivations of state and 
local actors. The goal, in each instance, should be forward move-
ment toward better policy—including policy experimentation, 
when needed—and stronger governing structures.
186. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND 
STATUTES ON HOME RULE AND LOCAL PROTECTIONS
This Appendix provides a qualitative grouping of key home rule 
and preemption features of state constitutions, statutes, and some 
judicial interpretation. It is not meant to provide a quantitative tal-
ly of states as it represents the author’s own interpretations. This 
analysis is based upon and gives much credit to the summaries and 
excerpts of state constitutions and laws compiled by Professor Paul 
Diller for the Legal Effort to Address Preemption (LEAP) project 
in May 2017. Unless otherwise noted, all source material comes 
from that database, which can be found at 
https://www.urbanlawcenter.org/copy-of-leap-materials-1.
The author also searched from new amendments to state consti-
tutions in 2017 and 2018 using https://ballotpedia.org/. As of 
January 13, 2019, there are no new amendments to state constitu-
tions relating to home rule.
TYPE AND STRUCTURE OF HOME RULE
States without Any Form of Constitutional Home Rule
DE, IN, MS Statutory home rule only
Other Notable States
AL Limited statutory home rule for municipalities; 
in 2015, a constitutional amendment granted 
some powers to counties, but it was not a grant 
of home rule power
NJ Statutory home rule; constitution abrogates 
Dillon’s Rule
VA Dillon’s Rule state, but local powers are broadly 
interpreted by courts
VT Dillon’s Rule state
States with Mixed Constitutional/Statutory Home Rule Structures
KS, MA Constitutional home rule for cities; statutory 
home rule for counties
UT County home rule is more limited and statutory; 
municipal home rule is constitutional
Non-Operative Constitutional Home Rule or Non-Self Executing 
Constitutional Home Rule Provisions
In these states, the constitution provides for or demands that the 
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legislature create mechanisms to provide for local home rule but 
does not provide home rule power.
CT, GA, KY, NV, NH, ND
Notable State
NH New Hampshire can be categorized as a Dillon’s
Rule state. The constitution provides that the 
state legislature can allow localities to choose 
their form of government from the types defined 
by statute. 
Level of Home Rule Units
This table distinguishes between municipalities and local units 
smaller than counties. Some states do not provide home rule to all 
of these units. For example, a state may provide for home rule for 
cities but not villages. These categorizations are based on states’
constitutions’ terminology, and individual states’ definitions may 
vary.
County Home 
Rule Only
AR, KY, MD, WV
City/Municipal 
Home Rule 
Only
AZ, ME, NE, NH, OK, RI, TX, WI, WY
Either and/or 
Both County 
and Municipal 
Home Rule
CA, FL, ID, IL, IA, MI, MS, MO, NV, NC, ND, 
OR, PA, TN, UT, WA
Notable States
GA County has constitutional home 
rule, constitution authorizes state 
legislature to provide for 
municipal home rule
KS Cities have constitutional home 
rule, counties have statutory 
home rule
MA County home rule is very limited
NJ County home rule is more limited 
than municipal home rule
NY County home rule is very limited
OH Municipal home rule can be 
interpreted as having greater 
power
SD Law also provides for chartered 
government that combine cities 
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and counties
UT County home rule is more limited 
and statutory; municipal home 
rule is constitutional
Note: In a few states where both counties and localities can 
exercise home rule powers, courts have held that local ordinances 
can supersede or exempt localities from county 
ordinance/control. These states include: IA, IL, KS, and OK. The 
opposite is true in FL. 
Other Home 
Rule Units
AK, CT Home rule provisions include 
“boroughs,” in addition to cities 
HI Each political subdivision can be 
a home rule unit. In Hawaii, 
political subdivisions are islands. 
LA Home rule for “any local 
subdivisions” that adopts a charter
MN, MT Home rule for any “local 
government unit” that adopts a 
charter
IMMUNITIES, PROTECTIONS, AND 
PROHIBITIONS RELATED TO HOME RULE
Examples of States with General Law Requirements
FL Limited generality requirement: chartered counties 
cannot be preempted by “special” (targeted) law. 
GA Constitution contains a uniformity clause prohibiting 
local laws where “provision has been made by an exist-
ing general law.” However, there is no known case law 
challenging a preemptive state law on these grounds. 
MD Constitution prohibits a law targeting Baltimore or any 
specific county. However, a law applicable to two or 
more counties is not considered a local or targeted 
law. 
MA Constitution requires general laws, but there are ex-
ceptions to the requirement: 1) a law is general if it 
applies to three or more local units, and 2) voters or 
local office holders can petition for special laws, as well 
as in a few other circumstances. 
MN Very detailed requirement. Prohibits targeted or spe-
cial laws on a variety of subjects but permits special 
laws with permission of the affected unit(s). Generality 
is prescribed as a judicial determination: “Whether a 
general law could have been made applicable in any 
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case shall be judicially determined without regard to 
any legislative assertion on that subject.” MINN. CONST.
art. XII, § 1.
RI State can pass general laws affecting local powers, alt-
hough laws affecting the structure of local government 
are not permitted. Special laws are permitted if ap-
proved by voters in the affect local unit.
NH Not quite a general law requirement: The legislature 
cannot change the charter or form of government of a 
local unit without approval from voters of the unit. 
NJ Not quite a generality requirement, but the legislature 
can only enact special or local laws with approval from 
voters or the local governing body in the affected unit.
NY General law requirement; special laws only when re-
quested by local governments, with separate rules for 
New York City.
TN Constitution prohibits special laws to remove local of-
ficers and special laws affecting a local unit, unless ap-
proved by the governing body or voters of the affected 
unit. 
TX Strong constitutional general law requirement, howev-
er it has not been used to challenge preemption laws. 
States that Prohibit Local Action that Conflicts with State Law
Local law 
cannot con-
flict with state 
law
FL, HI, IN, IA, ID, KS, KY, LA, MD, MA, ME, MT, 
NE, NH, NJ, NY, NC, OH, PA, TX, UT, WA, WV
Local law 
cannot con-
flict with gen-
eral state laws
AR, CT, GA, SC, TN
AL, 
DE
Judicial interpretation; state statute does 
not specify “general” law
MI “General law” is used inconsistently in the 
constitution and statute
MS “General law” is only used for counties, 
not municipalities
NV Term used in case law; state statute does 
not specify “general” law
NM Municipal governments can act except 
where “expressly denied by general law 
or charter”
OK Judicial interpretation; state statute does 
not specify “general” law
RI Judicial interpretation; state statute does 
not specify “general” law
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SD Home rule entity can take any action not 
denied by the general laws of the state
WI Local law cannot conflict with “any en-
actment of the legislature which is of 
statewide concern and which uniformly 
affects every county”
WY Local law cannot conflict with uniform 
state law
States Where Localities Have Any Form of Protection from 
Preemption (Excluding General Law Requirements)
AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, HI, KS, LA, ME, MD, MN, MO, NE, NM, ND, 
OH, OK, PA, RI, TN 
Notable State
OR Courts have adopted a presumption against implied 
(field) preemption; see supra note 151-52 and accom-
panying text. 
States Where the Right to Home Rule Depends on the Size of a 
Municipality
AK, CO, DE, IL, KY, MO, NE, PA, TX, WA
States with “Liberally Construed” Provisions
AK, CO, IL, KS, KY, ME, MI, MT, NJ, NY, NM, NC, ND, OR, PA, 
SC, SD, WV, WY
State Law Provides that Enumeration of Local Powers Does Not 
Limit Them
IN, IA, OH, UT, TN, VA
